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COMMENTS
FEDERAL JURISDICTION-THREE-JUDGE COURTS-THE RECENT
EVOLUTION IN JURISDICTION AND APPELLATE REVIEW-During its
1961 term the United States Supreme Court announced three decisions that are likely to have a profound effect on the administration of the Three-Judge Court Act. 1 All of these opinions deal
with the question of the authority of a single district court judge
to entertain the merits of litigation that meets the literal requirements of the statute and therefore apparently requires three judges
for proper disposition; one of them also considers the matter of
the jurisdiction of courts of appeals to review erroneous assumptions of jurisdiction by a district judge. While each decision is
individual and distinct from the others, there are certain significant points of resemblance.
This comment seeks to analyze each decision against its historical background. No more than a proforma attempt will be made
to integrate one decision with the others, for sufficient material is
not yet available to predict with any accuracy the Court's ultimate
achievements in this important area of federal civil procedure.
Whenever a plaintiff attacks the constitutional validity of a
state statute in a federal court and requests an injunction against
its continued operation, the district judge may not hear the case
alone, but under the Three-Judge Court Act he must summon
two other judges to his aid. 2 Congress enacted this provision in
1910 in response to the vigorous controversy created by Ex parte
1 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1958), which provides: "An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of such
statute or of an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under
State statutes, shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground
of the unconstitutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and
determined by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title." For
a thoughtful and extensive discussion of the statute, its scope and purpose, see generally
Note, 49 VA. L. R.Ev. 538 (1963). A similar enactment provides for a three-judge tribunal
whenever plaintiff requests an injunction against the operation or execution of a federal
statute on constitutional grounds. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958). Certain other proceedings
also require the convening of a three-judge court, such as a request for an injunction
against the operation of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2325 (1958), and in antitrust cases certified by the Attorney General, 63 Stat. 107
(1949), 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958), amending ch. 544, § 1, 32 Stat. 823 (1903).
2 The composition of all three-judge courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (Supp.
IV, 1963), which provides: "[T]he district judge to whom the application for injunction
or other relief is presented shall constitute one member of [the] ... court. On the filing
of the application, he shall immediately notify the chief judge of the circuit, who shall
designate two other judges, at least one of whom shall be a circuit judge."

[ 1528]

COMMENTS

1529

Young, 3 in which the Supreme Court held that a single federal
district judge could entertain a suit against a state officer requesting an injunction to restrain the enforcement of a state statute.
During the early I 900's the authority of federal courts to issue
injunctions was as yet uncircumscribed, and indeed interlocutory
decrees could then be issued without notice or full hearing. 4
These conditions created a clear opportunity for abuse, presenting the sovereign states with a significant threat to their independence. In response, Congress authorized the convening of a threejudge trial court to hear such cases.5 This special procedure had
previously been adopted for certain antitrust litigation6 and suits
to set aside or restrain orders entered by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.7 As a further safeguard against judicial invalidation
of state legislation, and to insure the expedition of such litigation,
the statute provided for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from
the final decision of three judges.8
Although the Court originally took a benevolent approach to
the construction of the Three-Judge Court Act,9 significant developments in state-federal relations and the practical problems in the
administration of the federal court system altered the Supreme
Court's attitude toward this procedure. First, as the United States
moved farther into the twentieth century the growth of social legislation, the increasing size of the federal government and the
s 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The following remarks of Senator Overman are indicative of
the congressional reaction: "[W]e have come to a sad day when one subordinate Federal
judge can enjoin the officer of a sovereign State from proceeding to enforce the laws
of the State. • • • That being so, there • • . [is] great feeling [against] the fact that
one Federal judge has tied the hands of a sovereign State." 42 CoNG. REc. 4847 (1908).
Two years later the same Senator stated: "I saw in Moody's Magazine last week that
there arc 150 cases of this kind now where one federal judge has tied the hands of the
state officers, the governor, and the attorney-general •..•" 45 CONG. REc. 7256 (1910).
4 "In 1910 the judges of the circuit courts had statutory authority, except as restrained by the prohibition against enjoining proceedings in state courts, to grant
restraining orders without notice, and interlocutory and final injunctions after notice
and hearing. [The issuance of] ••. such injunctions [was] .•• at the discretion of the
judge presiding." Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARv. L. REv. 795, 800 (1934).
See generally id. at 798-810.
5 See Senator Overman's remarks concerning the proposal: "[I]f this substitute is
adopted and three judges have to pass upon the question of the constitutionality of a
State statute and three great judges say that the statute is unconstitutional, the officers
of the State will be less inclined to resist the orders and decrees of our Federal courts."
42 CONG. REc. 4847 (1908).
o The Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 28 (1958).
7 34 Stat. 592 (1906) applied the procedure utilized under the Expediting Act, 32 Stat.
823 (1903), to such proceedings.
s 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958), amending ch. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
o See, e.g., Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911), which held that
a district judge did not possess subject-matter jurisdiction over a complaint requesting
the convening of a three-judge court on proper grounds.
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supremacy of the federal courts militated toward a less favorable
construction of the Three-Judge Act. It represented the very
things which the times did not condone-state sovereignty, independence and freedom from federal control. Secondly, Congress
severely restricted the power of federal judges to issue ex parte
injunctions.10 This change in the power of the district judge
undermined many of the considerations which led to the enactment of the original three-judge statute. Thirdly, the steady increase in the amount of litigation in the federal courts since the
turn of the century made the use of the three-judge procedure
particularly disruptive of judicial administration. 11 In districts
where the docket was crowded or where geographical distance
was a consideration, the transfer of two judges to a single district
for the purpose of hearing one case was especially burdensome.
Finally, the requirement of hearing a direct appeal from every
three-judge decision also imposed a not insignificant burden on
the time and energy of the Supreme Court.12 Not surprisingly,
therefore, the Court has taken the position that the statute is not
a statement of "broad social policy to be construed with great
liberality, but . . . an enactment technical in the strict sense of
the term and to be applied as such." 13
This process of limitation by construction, however, has not
resulted in a clear definition of the jurisdictional scope of the
three-judge court. Instead, it has substantially complicated the
problems of the litigant who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of
the appropriate federal court, and of the district judge who, in
the first instance, must determine whether or not the case "requires" three judges for proper disposition. Extraordinary confusion on the appellate level is a direct consequence of the distinctions that delimit the ambit of jurisdiction of the single judge
and the three-judge tribunal. Because the statute is jurisdictional
and not merely procedural, an error in the district court, in failing to con~ene a three-judge court, by its nature nullifies any subsequent proceedings.
10 As early as 1914 a statute had been enacted prohibiting the issuance of preliminary
injunctions without notice except in extreme circumstances, to be stated in the order,
and for a time not e.xceeding ten days. Anti-Trust Act of 1914 (Clayton Act), ch. 323,
§ 17, 38 Stat. 737, repealed by 62 Stat. 869 (1948). At the same time it was required
that injunctions and restraining orders set forth the reasons for their issuance. Ch. 323,
§ 19, 38 Stat. 738 (1914), repealed by 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
11 See, e.g., statements by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Phillips v. United States, 312
U.S. 246, 250 (1941) and in Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 156 (1962).
12 Id. at 250-51.
13 Id. at 251.
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I. Bailey v. Patterson: Limiting the Jurisdiction
of the Three-Judge Court-A Disputed as Well as
a Substantial Constitutional Question Is Required
for Three-Judge Jurisdiction
The early interpretations of the Three-] udge Act required
a district judge to convene the special tribunal upon a preliminary finding that plaintiff was proceeding directly against a state
officer, seeking and pressing for injunctive relief against the operation of a state statute, and alleging a constitutional ground in
support of his action. 14 The district judge was considered to be
simply without jurisdiction to entertain the merits of such a
complaint.
In Ex parte Poresky 1'(; the Supreme Court considered an important issue: whether the district judge could dismiss a suit,
apparently suitable only for a hearing before three judges, if the
allegations of the complaint raised a clearly insufficient constitutional claim. The Court held that the district judge possessed
such authority. While an early writer concluded that this decision
rested on the plaintiff's failure to raise a substantial federal question in support of his claim,16 both the nature of the statute and
subsequent cases dictate a different conclusion. The Three-Judge
Court Act sets forth its own jurisdictional requisites, which are
independent of the other provisions in the Judicial Code limiting
the jurisdiction of the district courts. The requirement here at
issue is whether plaintiff has asserted a substantial constitutional
ground for relief. While it is enticing to analogize the quality
of the question thus raised to the federal question jurisdiction
of the district courts, it is improper to do so.17 Only after the district judge finds the petition not suitable for a three-judge hearing
does he proceed to investigate whether the complaint raises a
federal question sufficient to support federal court jurisdiction
of the merits. Clearly, three judges are not required to entertain
a suit based on a sham pleading or one that raises only issues which
the Supreme Court has previously heard and determined. 18
14 Cumberland Tel. &: Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212 (1922);
Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539 (1911).
111 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
16 See Hutcheson, supra note 4, at 816. "But the provision requiring the presence
of a court of three judges necessarily assumes that the District Court has jurisdiction.
In the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial
federal question should be presented." 290 U.S. at 31.
17 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam). See also HART &: WESCHLER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 848-55 (1953).
18 E.g., Stuart v. Wilson, 282 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927
(1!161); Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 81!1 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
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Of course, a dismissal for want of a substantial federal question is an adjudication on the merits by the single judge, and
arguably a single judge ruling on the merits is the result that
Congress sought to avoid by passing the original statute. The
Court failed to recognize that Congress could provide any mode
of hearing it desired, and that merely because the claim for relief
might not be sustainable was no reason for denying plaintiff his
congressionally secured forum. The Poresky result satisfies, however, the purposes underlying the original enactment because,
at least in denying plaintiff's request for an injunction, the district
judge does not place state legislative schemes in jeopardy. This
case represents a turning point in the judicial construction of the
Three-Judge Act. From this decision flow all of the current major
limitations on the jurisdiction of the three-judge tribunal.
Dicta in Poresky also indicated that a three-judge tribunal
might not be required when an action involved questions which
had been considered by the Supreme Court and had become definitely settled in favor of the complainant so that there was no
dispute over his right to relief against the state statute being attacked.19 The validity of this dicta, however, was not tested before
the Supreme Court until after its decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.20 In Bailey v. Patterson21 the Court decided that a
19 This interpretation was first applied in the district courts. See Ludley v. Board
of Supervisors, 150 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1958);
Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 138 F. Supp. 336 (E.D. La.), mandamus denied, 351
U.S. 948 (1956); Willis v. Walker, 136 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. Ky. 1955). See also Shuttles•
worth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.) aff'd, 358 U.S. 101
(1958) (per curiam). See generally Comment, 19 LA. L. R.Ev. 813 (1959).
The following language in Poresky gave rise to these decisions: "The existence of
a substantial question of constitutionality must be determined by the allegations of
the bill of complaint. ••• The question may be plainly unsubstantial, either because
it is 'obviously without merit' or because 'its unsoundness so clearly results from the
previous decisions of this court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the
inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.'"
290 U.S. at 31.
20 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Of particular interest is the history of Tureaud v. Board of
Supervisors. A Negro plaintiff brought suit requesting an injunction to obtain admission
to Louisiana State University. The district judge accepted jurisdiction and granted a
temporary injunction. 116 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. La. 1953). The case was reversed on appeal
on the ground that the complaint alleged a constitutional ground for relief, and the
effect of the district judge's decision was to invalidate state legislation. 207 F.2d 807
(5th Cir. 1953). While a petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court's first
opinion in the Brown decision appeared. Soon thereafter the Court vacated the court
of appeals' judgment in Tureaud and remanded the decision "for consideration in the
light of the segregation cases ..• and conditions that now prevail." 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
On remand, the district judge entered the injunction and, on appeal, the court of
appeals held that the necessary effect of the Supreme Court's opinion was to place
jurisdiction of the merits within the competence of the district judge. 225 F.2d 434
(5th Cir. 1955).
21 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (per curiam).
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suit requesting injunctive relief to enforce plaintiff's rights to
non-segregated service in interstate and intrastate transportation
facilities did not require a hearing before a three-judge tribunal.
Thus, a sing]e district judge may grant injunctions impairing the
operation of state statutes when he finds the law clearly settled.
Bailey v. Patterson, while representing the prevalent opinion that
the federal judiciary is supreme, presents the spectre of a single
federal district judge invading the prerogatives of the states, and
denying them the protection of the three-judge procedure and
the benefit of the direct appeal provision. The Court refused to
consider the Three-Judge Court Act's express requirement that
only three judges may issue an injunction against the operation
of a state statute. Therefore, in each case the district judge must
now decide whether the plaintiff is asserting not only a substantial,
but also a disputed, constitutional right.
Obviously, a constitutional right does not either lose all vitality or become firmly established in one decision; rather, a gradual process of evolution is involved. The prevailing view of due
process is that it is not a static concept, but rather one containing certain minimal standards "which are 'of the very essence of
a scheme of ordered liberty.' " 22 Because the standards of due
process are not fixed, it is difficult for a single judge to determine
whether the Supreme Court has definitively settled a particular
question; if it has, there is no need for a three-judge tribunal, but
the failure to convene the special court when required results in
a heavy cost to both the litigants and the tribunals involved. The
requirement that the constitutional question be disputed, therefore, places the district judge in a difficult position. Under such
a test he must make, without the benefit of a hearing on the merits,
a value judgment concerning the scope of the constitutional issue.
While Bailey v. Patterson has obviously complicated the administration of the three-judge provision, its full impact has not yet
been felt, for no single judge has denied a three-judge tribunal
on questions outside the sphere of the segregation decisions. And
here the policy of the Court is clear: no man may be denied his
right to equal treatment in public places by reason of his color.
Another policy behind the original Three-Judge Act, however,
was the belief that the special tribunal would serve as a buffer
between state pride and the necessity of following the dictates of
the federal constitution in the shaping of state legislative pro22

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter,

J.,

concurring).
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grams. Although a series of Supreme Court decisions may settle
a previously disputed constitutional issue for the federal judiciary,
the states and parties most intimately involved may not consider
the issue foreclosed in the sense that it is no longer a proper subject of litigation; even the segregation issue remains viable in
many southern states. While most of the issues concerning the
segregation of public schools,23 parks,24 transportation facilities, 25
and indeed any publicly administered project26 are settled, does
the concept of "state action," as distinguished from private action,
include such activities as, for example, the supervision of a discriminatory scholarship fund by a private university? 27 These
questions are hardly "settled" today, but if the Supreme Court
should decide them with per curiam opinions, as it decided many
of the issues concerning the scope of Brown v. Board of Education,28 such decisions would presumably bar a litigant from the
three-judge forum. 29 Bailey v. Patterson permits the district judge
to decide whether the issue is foreclosed, and this certainly is a
subjective decision.
II. Kesler v. Department of Public Safety: Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Three-Judge Court-A Single Judge
Cannot Decide a Pre-emption Case When the Constitutional
Issue Is Sole and Immediate

While Bailey v. Patterson tends to limit its jurisdiction, Kesler
v. Department of Public Safety3° expands the jurisd1ction of the
special three-judge court. In Kesler plaintiff asserted that the federal Bankruptcy Act pre-empted Utah's financial responsibility
law, and requested an injunction against the enforcement of the
state statute. The district judge heard the complaint on the
E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
E.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, affirming
per curiam 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958).
25 E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, affirming per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956).
26 See St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State Action,
Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MICH. L. R.Ev. 993, 994 (1961).
27 See Note, 33 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 604, 615-16 (1958); Comment, 1963 WIS. L. R.Ev. 254.
28 See, e.g., State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959), affirming per
curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (state-regulated athletic contests); Holmes v.
City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public
golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, affirming per curiam 220
F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches); Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n,
347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and remanding per curiam 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953)
(public theaters).
29 Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962) (by implication).
so 369 U.S. 153 (1962), Ill U. PA. L. R.Ev. 113.
23
24
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merits and granted injunctive relief. 31 Prior Supreme Court opinions indicated that a pre-emption question did not require a
three-judge tribunal,32 but the Court reversed and remanded with
directions that three judges convene to hear the constitutional
arguments.
The conflict between a federal and a state statute, where both
seek to regulate an activity clearly within the ambit of federal
power, involves a direct conflict between the particular state stat- ·
ute and the federal constitution. The basis for a plaintiff's attack
is the constitutional argument that the supremacy clause33 recognizes only the validity of the federal statute and that it overrides
state legislation designed to impede its operation. The Court,
however, distinguished earlier decisions as involving issues of statutory construction rather than constituting a direct attack on a
state statute.84 Thus, a single judge may grant injunctive relief
against the operation of a state statute, but only if a preliminary
non-constitutional issue, such as whether plaintiff has standing to
challenge the state statute, precedes the constitutional question of
pre-emption.811 If, instead, the constitutional question is clearly
the only one presented, plaintiff's claim requires a three-judge
court for proper disposition. 36
Obviously, when a single judge grants injunctive relief against
the operation of a state statute, he violates Congress's intent, as
In re Kesler, 187 F. Supp. 277 (D. Utah 1960).
See, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 97 (1946), where the Court said "the complaint
[requesting an injunction against a state statute] did not challenge the constitutionality
of the state statute but alleged merely that its enforcement would violate the Emergency
Price Control Act. Consequently a three-judge court is not required." In Ex parte
Bransford, 310 U.S. 354, 359 (1940), the Court also stated that "the supremacy clause gives
superiority to valid federal acts over conflicting state statutes but this superiority for
present purposes involves merely the construction of an act of Congress, not the
constitutionality of the state enactment." See also Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926).
But see Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486 (1942) (suit to restrain the enforcement of
a state tax on sales at a post exchange as violative of the constitutional immunity of
federal agencies held to require a three-judge court).
33 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
84 369 U.S. at 156. The Court said that Ex parte Buder, 271 U.S. 461 (1926),
and Ex parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940), involved questions of construction, while
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), was not a direct attack on the state statute in
question. Query v. United States, 316 U.S. 486 (1942), was cited as controlling.
8li 369 U.S. at 158. Cf. Ex parte Buder, supra note 34.
36 369 U.S. at 158, citing Gully v. First Nat'I Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-18 (1936),
as the source for determining whether the constitutional question is sole and immediate.
See also Florida Lime &: Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73 (1960), where
plaintiff alleged that a California statute violated the commerce and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution, as well as an order of the Secretary of Agriculture issued
under a federal statute. The Court there held that joining a constitutional and a
non-constitutional ground of relief did not defeat the jurisdiction of a three-judge court.
81
82
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expressed in the Three-Judge Court Act, whether or not there
are preliminary questions of construction.87 The Court might
have taken this opportunity to restrict further the scope of the
special tribunal's jurisdiction, but it did not. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Kesler, said, "Neither the language of§ 2281 nor the purpose which gave rise to it affords the
remotest reason for carving out an unfrivolous claim of unconstitutionality because of the Supremacy Clause from the comprehensive language of § 2281." 88 Thus, the majority opinion in
Kesler reinforced the efficacy of the three-judge court provision,
and indeed retreated from the restrictive language employed in
some earlier decisions.
After deciding the jurisdictional issue, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
engaged in an extended discussion of the federal and state statutes
involved in Kesler, ultimately deciding that the plaintiff's claim
of federal pre-emption was unfounded.80 The dissent argued that
such extended statutory construction indicated that the action was
not meet for three judges because the constitutional question was
not immediate.40 Indeed, in dicta Frankfurter had indicated that
the existence of certain preliminary issues might justify the single
judge's taking jurisdiction of actions which superficially seemed
appropriate only for three judges.41 The majority opinion, however, skirts any explicit discussion of what such an issue might be.
In offering such criticism, the dissenters showed their failure to
grasp the full significance of the majority opinion. Kesler ably
demonstrates that deciding what court has jurisdiction of the
merits must be distinguished from whether the plaintiff's claim
can be sustained. A federal court must decide the jurisdictional
question as an independent issue; it cannot permit this issue to
become entangled with the ultimate question of plaintiff's right
to relief. Exemplifying the type of distinction to be drawn is
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. ]acobsen, 42 in which
the Court decided that merely because plaintiff has alleged a nonconstitutional ground of relief, as an alternative to constitutional
grounds, the jurisdiction of the three-judge court could not be
See note 1 supra.
369 U.S. at 156.
so 369 U.S. at 158-74.
40 369 U.S. at 177 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
41 "If in immediate controversy is not the unconstitutionality of a state law but
merely the construction of a· state law or the federal law, the three-judge requirement
does not become operative." 369 U.S. at 157.
42 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
87
88
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defeated, the other requirements of the statute having been met.
The statutory construction involved in Kesler, just as the alternative grounds put forth in Florida Lime, related solely to the
process of reaching an ultimate decision on the merits and had
no bearing on the preliminary question of jurisdiction. The minority in Kesler failed to distinguish between the prerequisites
for three-judge court jurisdiction, which are the existence of the
proper allegations and the request for injunctive relief against
the operation of a state statute, and the process of choosing the
basis of decision, which in pre-emption cases at least will necessarily involve an extended discussion of the statutes in issue. The
basis of the decision, however, should not affect the scope of threejudge court jurisdiction; Florida Lime makes this abundantly
clear.
Constitutional litigation involving the supremacy clause of
course often requires the construction of state legislation and,
therefore, may require the federal court to abstain from making
any decision until a state court has had an opportunity to review
the statute in light of the constitutional issues presented. The
Court's refusal to permit a district judge to decide the merits of
a pre-emption case, where the constitutional issue is sole and immediate, coincides with the decision of the Court in another important case involving the three-judge tribunal's jurisdiction.
The decision in Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein43 indicates that the district judge may abstain and permit
the local courts to construe a state enactment to determine a question of purely local law, such as whether the state statute affects
plaintiff's trade or business.44 The Court held in Idlewild, however, that a district judge may not abstain merely because the state
statute in question has never been construed in the local courts
when abstention will necessarily result in litigating the constitutional issue in state tribunals. 45 In terms of the constitutional issue
370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam).
"This is not a case like Chicago, Duluth &- Georgian Bay Transit Co. v. Nims, 252
F.2d 317, where a three-judge court was requested only in the event that it should
first be held that the state statute was by its terms applicable to the plaintiff's business
operations." 370 U.S. at 715 n.3.
45 "When an application for a statutory three-judge court is addressed to a district
court, the court's inquiry is appropriately limited to determining whether the constitutional question raised is substantial, whether the complaint at least formally
alleges a basis for equitable relief, and whether the case presented otherwise comes
within the requirements of the three-judge statute. Those criteria were assuredly met
here, and the applicable jurisdictional statute therefore made it impermissible for
a single judge to decide the merits of the case, either by granting or by withholding
relief" or invoking abstention. 370 U.S. at 715.
43
44
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they raised for the Supreme Court, I dlewild and Kesler are practically on all fours. In both the plaintiff attacked the validity of
a state enactment under the supremacy clause of the Constitution,
and in neither was there any preliminary non-constitutional question that would have justified an assumption of jurisdiction on
the merits by the single judge.
In Idlewild the New York statute in issue had never received
the benefit of state interpretation in the light of the substantial
constitutional issues presented. 46 Accordingly, the court first hearing such a petition normally could abstain to permit the New York
courts to construe the state legislation.47 Abstention in such a case,
however, is quite likely to result in the litigating of plaintiff's
constitutional arguments48 in the state courts. The doctrine of
res judicata, moreover, may preclude plaintiff from raising these
issues again in the still-pending federal litigation.49 If the district
judge had been permitted to abstain in Idlewild, therefore, the
three-judge court would have had no control over the forum that
determined the validity of plaintiff's constitutional claims. Thus,
abstention would have amounted to a federal decision on the
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), where a three-judge court correctly
abstained because an adjudication in the state courts may have materially altered the
constitutional issues or removed them from the case. But see NAACP v. Bennett, 360
U.S. 471 (1959), where the Court in a per curiam opinion held that a statute should
not be automatically referred to the state courts merely because there are questions
of state law present; Chicago v. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958), holding
that where the meaning of state statutes is clear it is permissible for a federal court
to proceed to judgment even where there has been no state adjudication.
48 See Government &: Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S.
364 (1957). In that case a three-judge court initially abstained pending an adjudication in the state courts. 116 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ala. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 901 (1954).
Plaintiff then initiated an action in a state court, in which he did not raise any of
the constitutional grounds alleged in the district court. This proceeding culminated in
an opinion by the Alabama Supreme Court that declared that plaintiff was within
the scope of the state statute. 262 Ala. 285, 78 So. 2d 646 (1955). When plaintiff returned
to the three-judge court to secure a final hearing on the constitutional issues, the court
dismissed the suit with prejudice, noting that "the Alabama courts have not construed
the [state enactment] in such a manner as to render it unconstitutional and, of course,
we cannot assume that the State courts will ever so construe [it)." 146 F. Supp. 214, 216
(N.D. Ala. 1956). On appeal to the Supreme Court the judgment was vacated and
remanded with directions to stay proceedings "until efforts to obtain an appropriate
adjudication in the state courts have been exhausted." 353 U.S. at 367. (Emphasis added.)
An "appropriate adjudication" in the state courts refers specifically to the raising of
the pertinent federal constitutional objections so that the state court can interpret the
state statute in light of these objections. Id. at 366. Cf. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 492
(1949). See also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 194 F. Supp. 521
(E.D. La. 1961), prob. juris. noted, 372 U.S. 904 (1963); Lassiter v. Northampton County
Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958), af/'d, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
49 England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, supra note 48. See Note,
Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HAR.v. L. REv. 1358 (1960).
46

47
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merits by the single judge, and, until the adjudication in the state
courts was complete, plaintiff would have no federal forum in
which to seek relief.Im Finally, the direct appeal provision permits
the Supreme Court to maintain close supervision over the progress
of three-judge court litigation,51 while the cases a single judge
hears come to the Court only after intermediate appellate review
and the grant of certiorari.52
Additionally, in Kesler the Court indicated that a district
judge might be able to decide a pre-emption case involving preliminary questions of construction; 53 and in ldlewild the Court
concluded by implication that a district judge could abstain for
the purpose of obtaining guidance from the state courts on nonconstitutional issues. 54 The Court also recognized in ldlewild that
often purely non-constitutional questions arise that may necessitate abstention. 155 If the district judge should abstain, the subsequent litigation may decide not only the questions of state law
but also the validity of the constitutional issues.56 Although this
procedure precludes the three-judge court from having any control over the progress of the action, the orderly administration of
justice requires it. Both the holdings and the implications of
I dlewild and Kesler represent a balance between the requirements
of the three-judge court statute and the disruption of orderly litigation that employment of this procedure entails.57 The district
judge, therefore, may abstain whenever abstention will not necessarily result in adjudication of the constitutional issues in the state
courts. Nevertheless, because the ability to abstain is consonant
with the power to decide the merits of a case, giving the district
judge broader authority to abstain than to decide the merits is
inconsistent with his jurisdiction under the statute. Saving to the
district judge the authority to abstain, except for the purpose of
necessarily allowing the state courts to decide the merits of the
constitutional issues, preserves the integrity of the three-judge
50 E.g., Glen Oaks Util., Inc. v. City of Houston, 280 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1960);
Ray v. Hasley, 214 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1954).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1958), amending ch. 309, § 13, 36 Stat. 557 (1910).
52 Mandamus has also been used by the Supreme Court to review a district judge's
decision to abstain. E.g., Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713
(1962).
53 369 U.S. at 157.
114 370 U.S. at 715.
55 Ibid. See generally ROBERTSON &: KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES § 199, at 356-59 (2d ed. Wolfson &: Kurland 1951).
56 See text accompanying note 48 supra.
57 See Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 156-57 (1962).
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court prov1s1on and permits the district judge to exercise the
maximum amount of control over the course of the action that
is consistent with his status as delineated in the three-judge
statute.58

III. I dlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein:
Rationalizing Appellate Jurisdiction-The Courts
of Appeals May Issue Corrective Orders When the
District Judge Has Invaded the Jurisdiction of the
Three-Judge Court
Not surprisingly, the increasing complexity of the issues that
district judges must resolve in deciding whether to impanel a
three-judge court has led to substantial problems in defining the
scope of appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals. 59 Before Poresky the district judge's decision
was relatively unsophisticated and, being so, the need for jurisdiction in the courts of appeals was not demanding. 60 In Ex
parte Metropolitan Water Co., therefore, the Supreme Court accepted plaintiff's petition for mandamus as a mode of testing the
denial of his petition for a three-judge court. 61 The Court sanctioned the use of the extraordinary writ for two reasons. First,
the Three-Judge Act provided no independent appellate remedy
for an erroneous decision by the district judge.62 Secondly, permitting an appeal to one of the courts of appeals and ultimate
appeal to the Supreme Court would substitute a slow process involving repeated appeals for the swift procedure of direct Supreme
Court supervision outlined in the statute. 63 In Stratton v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. the Supreme Court carried the reasoning of the
Metropolitan decision to its logical conclusion. 64
Stratton not only sanctioned mandamus in the Supreme Court
as the appropriate appellate proceeding to correct an erroneous
Cf. Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31 (1962); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933).
See generally ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 55, §§ 192-204, at 344-67;
Comment, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 555, 566-71 (1960).
60 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
61 220 U.S. 539 (1911). The extraordinary writ has continued to be the appropriate
mode of testing an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction by the district judge. E.g., Ex
parte Bransford, 310 U.S. 354 (1940); Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See generally
ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, op. cit. supra note 55, § 200, at 359-60. But cf. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962).
62 Ex parte Metropolitan Water Co., 220 U.S. 539, 546 (1911).
63 See Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 16 (1930), reversing sub
nom. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Emerson, 30 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1929) (granting petition for mandamus).
58
59

64

Ibid.
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jurisdictional decision by the district court, but also proscribed
the courts of appeals from entertaining appeals from any decision
of a district judge entered in excess of his jurisdiction. Although
this decision might have ·been narrowly construed, the courts of
appeals accepted it as precluding them from exercising any supervisory control over the district judge when he acted outside his
jurisdiction in deciding an issue appropriate only for a threejudge court. 65 Thus, even after Poresky permitted the district
court to assess the merits of the constitutional issue for a limited
purpose, the courts of appeals refrained from taking affirmative
action when the district judge erred in refusing to convene the
special tribunal. 66 Perhaps the similarity between a decision on
the merits that plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief,
which the district judge had no authority to enter, and a decision
that plaintiff had failed to raise a substantial and disputed constitutional question, which was within the competence of the
single judge, resulted in confusion at the appellate level concerning the scope of permissible reviewing authority. The failure
of the circuit courts to entertain such appeals, however, placed
the whole burden of reviewing the orders of district judges on
the Supreme Court. The Court therefore was sometimes called
upon to review the same controversy twice--once on a jurisdictional question by mandamus, and a second time on the merits
following a direct appeal. 67 Moreover, the Court had to scrutinize
each petition for mandamus carefully because it represented the
only recourse for a litigant denied his petition for a three-judge
tribunal.
65 See, e.g., Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1961).
After finding that the district judge had erred in abstaining, the court of appeals said:
"Anomalous as our position is, we feel bound by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Stratton, an opinion which that Court has never seen fit to reverse, and to which its
approval has been given when construing a companion section [of the three-judge acts],
28 U.S.C. § 2282. Ex parte Cogdell, 342 U.S. 163 (1951)." Id. at 429. Accord, Chicago,
D. &:. G.B. Transit Co. v. Nims, 252 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1958) (dictum); Waddell v. Chicago
Land Clearance Comm'n, 206 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir. 1953) (dictum).
66 Although the courts of appeals refused to intervene in a district judge's action in
an affirmative manner, they accepted and decided appeals from his decisions when he
had properly exercised his jurisdiction. See Chicago, D. &: G.B. Transit Co. v. Nims, supra
note 65; Waddell v. Chicago Land Clearance Comm'n, supra note 65.
67 The subsequent history of Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 282 U.S. IO
(1930), presents such an example. After remand, plaintiff had the merits of the action
tried in a district court of three judges, which granted relief. On direct appeal, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that plaintiff had an adequate remedy in the state
courts. 284 U.S. 530 (1932). Finally, the controversy reached the Supreme Court of
Illinois, where the statute was declared unconstitutional. 353 Ill. 273, 187 N.E. 498
(1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 673 (1934).
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Idlewild, 68 however, may change this unsatisfactory situation.
In that case, after the district judge had abstained,69 plaintiff
appealed to the Second Circuit.70 That court found that the district judge had exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding to abstain,
but held that Stratton prevented it from taking affirmative action
to correct the error.71 Plaintiff then went back to the district court
and filed another petition for a three-court tribunal, but again
the single judge abstained, finding that, because the court of appeals did not have jurisdiction of the appeal, its opinion that he
had erred was merely dicta. 72
Finally, plaintiff filed both an appeal from the Second Circuit
decision and a mandamus petition in the Supreme Court. The
issue was squarely presented: Did the courts of appeals have any
supervisory control over erroneous jurisdictional decisions on the
district court level? The Supreme Court responded by justifying
an assumption of jurisdiction at the intermediate appellate level
whenever the district judge's decision effectively put plaintiff out
of court. 78 In Idlewild, invoking abstention did so, because no
litigation was pending in the state courts and, of course, this
decision foreclosed resort to the federal forum. 74 The decision,
however, did not completely overrule the Stratton case,71' but it
does intimate strongly that the courts of appeals should be less
reluctant to accept such appeals and indeed that their jurisdiction
is mandatory in certain limited circumstances.
Because I dlewild sanctions review by the courts of appeals of
an erroneous decision ·by a district judge that puts plaintiff out
of court, it partially dissipates the confusion that previously existed
concerning the scope of appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court's opinion, however, is not clear and certainly does not give
the appellate courts a mandate to supervise any excess of jurisdiction on the district court level. The Court, for instance, does
370 U.S. 713 (1962).
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 188 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1961).
See note 65 supra for a quotation from the court's opinion.
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 194 F. Supp. 3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
"Stratton does not stand for the broad proposition that a court of appeals is
powerless ever to give any guidance when a single judge has erroneously invaded the
province of a three-judge court. The Court of Appeals clearly stated its opinion that
a court of three judges ought to have been convened to consider this litigation. That
view was correct and should have been followed upon the petitioner's renewed motion
that such a statutory court be impaneled." 370 U.S. at 716.
74 See id. at 714; Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 428
(2d Cir. 1961).
75 370 U.S. at 715-16.
68
69
70
71
72
78
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not intimate whether the Second Circuit would have been acting
properly in accepting an appeal from the district court if the
same or similar litigation had been pending in the state courts.
Abstention here would merely have foreclosed the federal forum.
However, if the Court views the authority to abstain as being the
equivalent of jurisdiction to decide the merits, abstention when
the constitutional issue is sole and immediate is an invasion of
three-judge court jurisdiction. The importance of abstention and
its effect of prolonging constitutional litigation certainly makes it
appropriate to have a speedy remedy, either of appeal or mandamus, available.
Although it is not possible to decide exactly what are the
limits of I dlewild, it does point to a more rational system of appellate jurisdiction. Surely, the lack of appellate authority in the
courts of appeals to rectify an erroneous jurisdictional determination of a district court is anomalous. For example, when a district
judge erroneously accepts a diversity case, the appellate tribunal
on review will merely vacate and remand with directions to dismiss. 76 When a district judge decides a case which is appropriate
for a three-judge tribunal, the same kind of authority to review
and correct the decision of the lower court should exist. The issue
in most three-judge court cases is not the broad one of whether
there is federal jurisdiction of the cause, but only what court
within the federal system may properly exercise jurisdiction over
the merits of the litigation.
The courts of appeals, of course, should have appellate jurisdiction over questions that are within the scope of the district
judge's authority. 77 Because the district judge may investigate
the merits of the complaint to determine whether the constitutional issues presented are substantial, disputed, and sole and immediate, the appellate courts have derivative authority to supervise the district judge's action in these areas. ldlewild, therefore,
by implication indicates that the courts of appeals are not without authority to supervise the district judge when he exceeds his
jurisdiction in one of these matters. But I dlewild does not intimate whether the courts of appeals may correct the district judge
where he decides the merits of a cause proper for consideration
only by three judges.
76 E.g., Tiedemann v. Brownell, 222 F.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1955); French v. Jeffries,
149 F.2d 555 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 755 (1945).
77 See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 430-32 (2d Cir.
1961) (Lumbard, C.J., dissenting).
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Prior to Stratton a district judge had no power to entertain
the merits of a complaint requesting an injunction against the
operation of a state statute; the scope of appellate review was
thus easily defined. However, the growth of a district judge's
authority to issue injunctions in actions previously proper only
for three judges has undermined the basic premise on which
Stratton was decided. Appellate courts are constantly involved in
reviewing both errors in jurisdictional decisions and the merits
of controversies in which district judges have exercised authority
within one of the many exceptions to three-judge court jurisdiction. If Idlewild did not overrule Stratton, the Supreme Court
has certainly indicated dissatisfaction with the piecemeal process
of appellate review which that decision encouraged.

IV. Conclusion
The scope of three-judge c9urt jurisdiction is definitely in the
process of evolution. While Bailey v. Patterson restricts the jurisdiction of the special tribunal, Kesler and Idlewild embark on
integrating this procedure with the other decision-making devices
utilized in the federal judicial system. But even Bailey v. Patterson
emphasizes the important nature of the litigation coming before
three-judge courts. At the present time, cases involving stateenforced racial segregation are not sufficiently controversial to
merit such special consideration-the constitutional principles
have been established, and the necessity for an expanded tribunal
has waned. However, the two most important recent decisions
respecting the role of the three-judge court, Kesler and Idlewild,
foretell an entirely new approach to the whole system of threejudge litigation. In Kesler the Court refused to limit further the
jurisdiction of the special tribunal, and instead enlarged it. The
source of the constitutional issue, so long as it is sole and immediate, has become unimportant. The real test is whether the
issue is ripe for decision and whether plaintiff seeks an injunction against the enforcement of a state statute which is in direct
conflict with federal legislation or the Constitution. Thus, the
Court has simplified the indicia of three-judge court jurisdiction,
in rejecting the continued maintaining of tenuous distinctions
concerning the construction of state enactments.
Of the three cases here considered, I dlewild apparently will
have the greatest impact on future developments. One of the keys
to an organized and effective judicial system is an orderly and com-
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paratively simplified system of appellate jurisdiction. Idlewild
takes substantial steps in this direction. Now the courts of appeals
have jurisdiction to review the procedural errors of the district
judge, in failing to convene a three-judge court or in abstaining
when to do so will permit a state court to litigate the merits
of an action suitable only for three judges. Idlewild should be
extended to include within the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals
the power to issue a corrective order when the district judge has
erroneously entertained the merits of a petition proper only for a
three-judge court. The utilization of the mandamus proceeding
in the Supreme Court should be limited to securing review, at
an interlocutory stage, as to whether three judges are required. At
such an early stage in the proceedings the parties should not have
to take an intermediate appeal, for this may unduly delay a trial
on the merits and, in this instance, only the Supreme Court can
give them an authoritative opinion.
While the Court had previously concentrated on limiting the
jurisdiction of the three-judge court, today it seems to be concentrating on simplifying the administration of the Three-Judge
Court Act. Whenever a single judicial system encompasses two
courts of original jurisdiction, one for general litigation and the
other for specialized actions, difficult questions concerning the
jurisdictional scope of each will arise. But the speed with which
the three-judge court provision permits current and undecided
constitutional questions to reach the Supreme Court makes the
maintenance of this procedure, and the development of simple
rules as to jurisdiction and appellate review, of no little importance.
Peter W. Williamson, S.Ed.

